

# Eight Ways to End the Super Floods

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## Ottawa River Flood Alliance's (ORFA) Overview

Disasters, whether natural or man-made, often result from a combination of complex, interconnected factors, each contributing to a larger systemic failure. Just as air travel tragedies rarely stem from a single mistake, but instead emerge from multiple contributing factors, the reoccurring super floods along the Ottawa River Watershed can be seen as the outcome of a series of interconnected decisions and events. The Boeing 737 faced challenges even before it left the assembly line... Our whitepaper's aim is to similarly compare the fact that these reoccurring super floods were caused by contributing factors and known issues that are being ignored. It also provides eight actionable steps to address them before the next preventable flood.

Following the major flooding events of 1974–1976 and 1979, media and government attention was intensely focused on flood prevention. It was during this period that the Ottawa River Planning Board (ORRPB) study and subsequent Agreement were adopted. In the early 1980s, the operating strategy appeared to reflect the priorities of Andre Harvey's work, with an emphasis on maximizing flood prevention. Dam operators were closely monitored, scrutinized, and put on notice.

Since then, it seems that every decade or so, minor adjustments have been made to the operating strategies. These changes, generally favouring hydro productivity, have gradually reduced the emphasis on flood risk management. While these small adjustments went largely unnoticed by the public, they were often accompanied by biased internal studies that supported the same minor variances. Unfortunately, these changes have gone unchallenged by a Board that, in many cases, has been influenced by powerful lobbying forces.

The past decade has seen the culmination of these incremental changes, resulting in increasingly frequent and devastating "super floods." These super floods are expected to become more common as government policies continue to prioritize hydro production over public safety. The small changes that contributed to this shift have been thoroughly studied and identified by ORFA members, and sadly we can list the devastating impacts of these decisions in this document.

For decades, municipalities, businesses, landowners, and dam operators have coexisted peacefully along the shores of the Ottawa River Watershed. However, recent years have seen a rise in devastating super floods—in the springs of 2017, 2019, and 2023—with two other significant events in November 2023 and again in April 2024.

These super floods are driven by hydro production demands and decision-making focused more on profit than on flood protection and human safety. ORFA's research shows that these floods will continue unless targeted actions are taken by federal and provincial officials, in Ontario and Quebec, to prioritize flood prevention across the entire Watershed, not just in Montreal. History has shown that this can be done—and it must be done again. Since the 2017 super flood, ORFA's members have conducted extensive research using real-time and historical data regarding river flows, precipitation, legislative accountability, and the mandates of regulatory bodies. Our findings have identified four key contributing factors to the reoccurring super floods and eight actionable, readily available steps that prioritize flood prevention over hydro production, particularly during the annual Freshet.

The eight action items, detailed in this whitepaper, are accompanied by a comprehensive overview of the devastating impacts the Ottawa River Watershed communities, businesses, and residents have faced since 2017. Most importantly, this paper outlines the critical contributing factors that governments must address to prevent further super floods and avert the potential for a major catastrophe along the Ottawa River—think Boeing 737-type disaster.

This issue is critical not only to us as a grassroots organization but also to the more than 2 million people who live and work along the Ottawa River. It is equally important to municipal leaders, insurance companies, and, most urgently, the thousands of flood victims affected by these events. We CAN reduce flood risks for residents, municipalities, insurance companies, and the natural environment by taking the following actions:

1. Urging specific federal and provincial government officials to recognize the dangerous contributing factors outlined in this paper, before their constituents face further devastation or, worse, a preventable 737-type catastrophe.
2. Holding these government officials accountable for enforcing the existing laws and regulations related to flood prevention.
3. Ensuring that these officials implement the eight actionable steps identified in this paper to mitigate the super floods described by ORFA.

And we must take immediate action—before the spring Freshet of 2025—to prevent future flooding events.

## Federal and Provincial Legislation: Good News

The good news is that the necessary legislation for flood prevention along the entire Ottawa River Watershed is already in place. The bad news is that this legislation is not being enforced. One example of such legislation is the 1999 Ontario Lakes and Rivers Improvement Act (LRIA), which includes "*protection of the interests of riparian owners as well as protection of persons and of property by ensuring that dams are suitably located, constructed, operated and maintained*" as a primary objective, which is reinforced throughout the Act.

Further, ORFA has discovered that existing Water Management Plans (WMPs), which dam operators and regulators are legally required to implement, contain specific safety constraints regarding water levels. These WMPs, quote: "...define the maximum and minimum levels to be respected in regular operations as well as the critical maximum and minimum levels to avoid at all times." They include actual numeric water level measurements which, by law, should be respected during specific periods. The table below, taken from the Carillon Dam WMP, refers to the *Spring Flood Season* (the Freshet) and the *Boating Season*, among other seasons of operation.

Upstream level (m)		Comments
Critical maximum	41.5	As per agreement.
Operating maximum	41.15	As per agreement. During the <u>spring flood</u> , the <u>maximum level is 40.08 m</u> when the level at the Hull dock exceeds the servitude level of 42.61 m.
Operating minimum	39.62	As per agreement. Outside the <u>boating season</u> , the <u>minimum operating level is 40.54 m</u> . During boating season, the minimum is 40.84 m. During the <u>flood period</u> , the minimum is 39.62 m.
Critical minimum	39.62	

**Spoiler Alert:** Operating constraints for the ‘Spring Flood Season’ are NOT being enforced.

ORFA’s research also reveals a troubling lack of enforcement of these operating limits by both federal and provincial authorities. Additionally, despite repeated requests, the WMPs for Ontario’s and Quebec’s dam operators have not been provided to us. The Ottawa River Regulation Planning Board (ORRPB) and the

Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) have indicated that “... in the case of the Ottawa River basin, given the interprovincial nature and the mix of different dam owners on it, it is “...*not an appropriate situation for a Water Management Plan*”.

While we cannot fault dam operators for prioritizing hydro production, given their corporate mission and contribution to clean energy production, we must hold them accountable for respecting the established operating limits. Despite benefiting from flow alterations in the Watershed over many years, operators have not adequately addressed the negative impacts of flooding, sediment displacement, contamination, and shoreline erosion.

It is also important to note that dam operators are only responsible for their individual dams, not the overall management of the Watershed. This lack of coordination, combined with the absence of enforced WMPs, raises serious concerns about the safety and coherence of decision-making throughout the watershed, particularly during high-water events.

Our research clearly shows that dam operators are operating with little to no intervention from government officials. While guided by their dam's safety margins within their water power leases, these operators—who stand to gain financially—are essentially self-managing their dams' safety and operational constraints without any regulatory oversight. Laws designed to enforce water safety measures, safety planning, and water management limits are not being upheld. When ORFA inquired about this lack of enforcement, we were told that due to the multi-jurisdictional nature of the Ottawa River Watershed, it is “*not an appropriate situation for a Water Management Plan*”.

This means that, instead of utilizing the existing layers of jurisdictional legislation to protect riparian communities, businesses, and municipalities, our governments have been neglecting these protections. How do we know this? ORFA has discovered that Water Management Plans (WMPs) do exist, and they include constraints designed to protect environmental factors such as fish spawning, municipal water supplies, and sewage systems. Importantly, these types of constraints ARE being enforced.

Addressing the issue of "interprovincial complexity," any dam that spans two jurisdictions is required to comply with the laws of both provinces. For instance, the Carillon Dam, which is in both Quebec and Ontario, requires that its operator adhere to the regulations of both provinces. While this requirement has historically applied to laws governing the construction and improvement of dams, it does not extend to water management or dam safety. Important to remember that the federal government serves as the final arbiter in disputes between Ontario and Quebec over the management of the river.

It is difficult to reconcile the fact that the Ottawa River Watershed—often described as “the most regulated system in Canada” due to its extensive infrastructure—lacks proper regulatory oversight, especially when it comes to flood prevention. And to clarify, the term “most regulated system” refers only to the number of dams and structures, not the number of active regulations.

Drawing parallels with the Boeing 737 analogy—where a series of contributing factors led to disaster—ORFA has learned that the ultimate responsibility for managing the Ottawa River Watershed **lies with our governments**. However, they have lost sight of the critical balance between hydro production and flood prevention, prioritizing profits over public safety.

## Contributing Factors to the Reoccurring Super Floods

ORFA's research has identified four key contributing factors to flooding, which our governments must address immediately to stop the reoccurring floods along the Ottawa River Watershed:

**Contributing Factor 1: WMPs are not required for Ottawa River operators:** In 2002, the Government of Ontario mandated that all dam operators in the province must prepare public safety plans and WMPs for their infrastructure, they renewed this requirement with a review in 2016. The Quebec government similarly has the same legal requirement. However, this legislation is not being enforced for operators along the Ottawa River Watershed. Furthermore, despite repeated requests over the years, access to the WMPs for Ontario and Quebec-operated generating stations has been denied. The Ottawa River Regulation Planning Board (ORRPB) and the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry (MNR) have both admitted that “... *in the case of the Ottawa River Basin, given the interprovincial nature and the mix of different dam owners on it, it is not an appropriate situation for a Water Management Plan*”.

**Contributing Factor 2: There is currently no regulatory oversight in place to govern the actions of dam operators along the Ottawa River:** The ORRPB is self-admittedly “not a control board” and, as such, has no authority over the dam operators that regulate our water levels. Per their own website, the ORRPB was “established to ensure integrated management of the principal reservoirs of the Ottawa River Basin”. While the ORRPB has frequently stated, often on behalf of the hydro companies, that the integrated management plan aims to “reduce flood and drought impacts along the Ottawa River and its tributaries,” ORFA’s findings indicate that this claim does not align with the reality of the situation as some reports found that their base case is scientifically flawed.

Since 2017, the ORRPB has served as the primary agency for addressing flood-related concerns for victims. However, as previously noted, it lacks regulatory authority, raising questions about whether it has essentially become a façade for governmental inaction.

The ORRPB operates in conjunction with the Committee (ORRC) and the Secretariat, both of which report directly into the Planning Board. The Regulating Committee is comprised of four members: two from Quebec, one from the federal government, and one from Ontario. The Board itself consists of seven members, with three representing the federal government, two from Quebec, and two from Ontario.

The four members of the Regulating Committee represent agencies operating dams, generating stations, and reservoirs along the Ottawa River Watershed, including tributaries. These agencies include Hydro Quebec, Ontario Power Generation (OPG), the Ministère de l’Environnement (MELCCFP), and Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC).

The Regulating Committee is responsible for establishing agreements on regulatory strategies as outlined by the Board. The members of the Committee are also responsible for the day-to-day operations of the principal reservoirs owned by their respective agencies. However, under the current understanding, operators are granted considerable discretion through the ORRC, provided they operate their infrastructure within established safety margins and adhere to their assigned water power lease. The dams below the reservoirs are NOT part of the ORRPB or the ORRC’s mandate.

Although the ORRC is responsible for setting reservoir outflows in accordance with the Flood Reserve Policy to protect Montreal, it is essentially a self-regulating body without enforcement mechanisms such as penalties or fines for non-compliance. The ORRC also played a role in the diversion process of 2017, whereby a risky flood control decision was taken to purposely divert water from its normal route, down the Gatineau section to the Timiskaming-Abitibi Reservoir, into the Ottawa River.

It is reasonable to deduce that the ORRC is likely to play an active role in monitoring and controlling reservoir levels in a manner that aligns with the interests of the power companies all year long, including the lead-up to Freshet.

**Contributing Factor 3: Lack of Federal and Provincial Enforcement of Legislation Grounded in Flood Protection Principles and Obvious Conflicts of Interest:** Federal and provincial enforcement of legislation that protects riparian rights and compels dam owners to operate in a way that mitigates flooding is effectively nonexistent and subject to clear conflicts of interest. While ORFA acknowledges some level of oversight by governments concerning the construction and structural improvements of dams, there is a notable absence of oversight in relation to flood prevention and water level control. No legislative enforcement exists to ensure flood prevention measures are implemented.

Ontario's Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR), Quebec's MELCCFP, and the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC) are responsible for establishing priorities, setting operational guidelines such as WMPs, and utilizing existing regulations to enforce flood prevention constraints on dam owners. However, these government agencies are currently ignoring enforcement mechanisms in place to ensure flood prevention is prioritized.

It is important to highlight that Hydro Québec, Evolgen, and the MELCCFP control the majority of generating stations, as well as approximately 75% of the reservoirs within the Ottawa River Watershed. Additionally, Hydro Québec is fully owned by the Quebec government, while the OPG is wholly owned by the Ontario government, creating a potential for conflicts of interest concerning flood mitigation efforts. These companies are expected to operate the infrastructure in a way that prioritizes flood prevention, yet high water levels directly contribute to greater hydroelectric power generation, which ultimately drives their profits. This creates an inherent conflict, as flood prevention measures that reduce water levels may negatively impact their revenue.

**Contributing Factor 4: Lack of Awareness or Ignorance of Legal Accountability for Flood Prevention by Provincial, and Federal Officials:** Provincial and federal officials appear either unaware of, or are deliberately ignoring, their legal accountability for flood prevention. Elected government officials at all levels who have met with ORFA members over the past six years have mistakenly believed that the ORRPB/ORRC is responsible and accountable for operating the Watershed system in a manner that prioritizes flood prevention. This critical misunderstanding, which spans three levels of government and two provinces, is deeply concerning. It has not only shaped the objectives of our whitepaper but also formed the eight actions required to prevent the recurrence of catastrophic flooding.

## Documented Risks of Ignoring Contributing Factors

So far, the failure to address the contributing factors outlined above has led to the following significant and alarming risks of catastrophic failures across the Ottawa River Watershed:

1. **Hazard Potential:** ORFA's research has revealed that the various Dam Safety Acts (Federal, Ontario, and Quebec) have identified, by definition and within their framework, that most dams along the Ottawa River have a "Hazard Potential" that is alarmingly ranked as "Very High." Any failure upstream would result in progressive and devastating consequences for downstream infrastructure and communities, potentially causing catastrophic damage.
2. **Municipal Emergency Preparedness:** The absence of full access to WMPs and dam-related safety and security documentation severely limits municipalities in developing effective and precise emergency preparedness strategies. Given the increasing frequency of flooding and the unpredictable nature of our changing climate, this lack of information places human lives at significant risk. In this regard, the Chief Administrative Officer of Clarence-Rockland, Pierre Voisine, has authorized ORFA to use the following statement:

*“While the installation of gauges and predictive modeling has had a positive impact on understanding the probability of flooding on the Ottawa River as it relates to snowpack, rain and other natural influences, Municipalities and their emergency responders need more help in managing the flooding impacts. Municipalities are left to manage these impacts from a funding, training, and equipment perspective. There is little done in understanding the impacts of development and drainage along the river, and we have no clarity or input on work done in developing water management strategies to prevent or reduce the impacts of flooding.”*

## Direct Impacts of the Reoccurring Super Floods

It is easy to recall that less than one year ago, in April 2024, despite a record low annual snowpack and only one significant rain event during the month, the decisions made by operators along the watershed resulted in weeks of dangerously high levels and flows. Specifically, opting not to empty the primary reservoirs and instead choosing an early refill which caused a situation where, on April 1<sup>st</sup>, when the reservoirs should normally be empty, they were filled to 50% capacity. This shows that flood prevention was not a priority during the 2024 Freshet.

Furthermore, with the ORRPB's mandate now redefined from "protection against flooding" to "reducing flood and drought impacts," alongside the removal of in-person water management by dam and reservoir operators, the risk of catastrophic flooding seems inevitable unless enforcement mechanisms are reinstated. Immediate action from government officials is critical to prevent further suffering and mitigate the impacts of future events.

The following impacts, directly attributable to the reoccurring super floods, have been extensively documented:

1. **Deaths and Injuries:** "A Pontiac woman (2019) and two first responders (2023) in Charlevoix, QC, were killed due to flood waters." Additionally, thousands of individuals have sustained injuries while responding to or combating the floods.
2. **Financial:** The floods have resulted in millions of dollars in damages to private property, income loss, disruptions to shoreline businesses, and a month-long closure of the Ottawa River to all boat traffic. Infrastructure has been extensively damaged, and there has been prolonged reliance on fuel-powered pumps and generators. Property and business owners are facing rapidly increasing insurance premiums, with limited flood protections—particularly for non-primary residence owners. Many properties have experienced declining values, and in the wake of the super floods, numerous major financial institutions have refused to refinance or provide financing for affected properties. In 2019, the federal government mobilized 2,000 Canadian military personnel to assist in multiple flood-affected regions of Ontario and Quebec. To illustrate the scale of financial loss, Wilderness Tours—an award-winning business operating along the Ottawa River Watershed since 1975—suffered losses exceeding \$1 million in 2019 alone due to that year's super flood.
3. **Housing:** Many residences have been damaged, condemned, demolished, or required extensive repairs and updates. Flooding has led to the permanent displacement and homelessness of thousands of individuals.
4. **Public Health and Safety:** Floodwaters have brought raw sewage from septic systems and other runoff (including agricultural runoff), debris from erosion, and shoreline property damage (e.g., docks, appliances, uprooted trees). Additionally, live hydro equipment and exposed wiring pose significant safety risks to homes and roadways. Stagnant pools of water and stranded fish and

wildlife, combined with decaying debris left after the river receded, exacerbated public health concerns.

5. **Mental Health:** Anxiety, depression, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and other undiagnosed conditions have become prevalent as a direct result of the floods. Many individuals have sought help at CLSCs and emergency departments, yet there has been a lack of intervention, relief, and assurance regarding future flood prevention and remediation. This anxiety reoccurs every spring.
6. **Infrastructure:** City and provincial roads, pathways, parks, municipal docks, ferries, bridges, and sewers have been repeatedly overwhelmed by contaminated floodwaters, leading to significant erosion and damage. In Gatineau alone, the super flood of 2017 caused \$5.95 million in damages, with the Quebec government compensating property owners an additional \$3.4 million. These figures represent only one municipality and one flood year, underscoring the widespread and ongoing impact.
7. **Municipal Resources:** Significant human and vehicular resources were mobilized for tasks such as sandbagging, debris removal, waste management for septic and sewer damages, and providing ongoing communications with affected flood victims and businesses.
8. **Environmental:** While many other organizations, such as Ottawa Riverkeeper, Les amis de la rivière Gatineau, and Friends of Petrie Island, are concentrating their efforts on addressing the broad environmental impacts of the super floods, ORFA remains focused on the specific flood-related impacts, with *flood prevention* as our top priority.

Thousands of flood victims in Ontario and Quebec are calling for immediate governmental action to prevent the reoccurrence of super floods along the Ottawa River Watershed. This demand is driven by two key factors:

- The devastating and costly impacts outlined above are demonstrably preventable.
- Management of the Ottawa River Watershed is increasingly centered on the growing demand for hydroelectric power, with water being intentionally stored as a corporate asset, often at the expense of flood victims, under the pretext of addressing "drought anxiety."

## Eight Actions to Prevent the Reoccurring Super Floods

Effective measures to reprioritize flood prevention are readily available. They are designed to significantly mitigate the risks, thereby reducing the known devastating impacts of the reoccurring super floods on our communities, businesses, and our environment. Drawing from ORFA's extensive research and comprehensive data analysis across the entire Ottawa River Watershed, eight actionable steps for immediate action have been identified:

1. **Enforce Immediate Regulatory Intervention:** Implement immediate regulatory action in Ontario and Quebec to enforce the WMPs for all dams along the Ottawa River Basin, prioritizing flood prevention capabilities specifically before and during the Freshet, and in the case of extreme weather events. Immediately enforce existing Freshet and other flood prevention directives. It is critical to ensure that minimum water levels for reservoirs are maintained before and during known high-flow events and exceptional weather conditions driven by climate change.



2. **Establish a New Governing Body:** Create a new governing body tasked with upholding the essential mandate of flood prevention before and during Freshet and high-intensity climate events, a mandate which has now been disregarded. The current structure is clearly ineffective. The new body must be empowered to approve operational policies that prioritize flood prevention during peak flow periods such as Freshet, with the authority to enforce these policies. Additionally, this governing body should represent the interests of riparian owners, municipalities and businesses, rather than being unduly influenced by energy sector lobbyists who currently exert significant control over the ORRPB, including the ORRC and the Secretariat.

ORFA faced a critical decision point when determining whether our research supported flooding solutions that could be realistically implemented, enforced, or adopted by the ORRPB. This was a decision that was carefully considered. Our team agreed that specific answers were needed from the ORRPB to help guide this determination. On January 10th, 2025, ORFA sent a list of questions to the ORRPB regarding its mandate and responsibilities, requesting a response by January 17th to inform the final version of this whitepaper. However, on January 21st, 2025, the Secretariat replied, stating that "...it was impossible for the Planning Board to respond within such a short period." As of the publication of this white paper, no further response has been received regarding these core mandate questions.

The absence of a response, coupled with many other factors, has led us to conclude that, based on its current structure and direction, the ORRPB, as it stands now, is unlikely to prioritize flood prevention and public safety over the interests of hydro production, particularly during the Freshet or other high-flow events.

3. **Ensure Transparency and Oversight:** Implement measures to guarantee transparency and oversight of all dam and reservoir operators within the Ottawa River Watershed. Hydrologists employed by hydroelectric companies should NOT be involved in governmental teams responsible for setting priorities, rewriting legislation and regulations related to water management for the Ottawa River Watershed, as this creates a clear conflict of interest.
4. **Reevaluate the Flood Reserves and Water Diversion Policies:** On a trial basis, eliminate the ineffective Flood Reserves Policy, which was enacted in 1998 and has prioritized Montreal's protection above all else, including during the 2017 super flood. Prevent water diversion manoeuvres such as the ones utilized in 2017. These policies seem to contribute to increased flooding risk in the upstream sections of the Ottawa River.
5. **Reinstate On-Site Qualified Officials:** Reinstate the presence of qualified on-site officials to monitor and communicate Watershed flow and levels prior to and throughout the Freshet. This will ensure that necessary adjustments can be made swiftly to address fluctuations, diversions, and unexpected climate events.
6. **Maintain and Expand Hydrometric Equipment:** Ensure consistent monitoring, maintenance, and expansion of hydrometric equipment across the entire Ottawa River Watershed. Immediately replace defective or missing equipment to ensure timely, accurate data is available on trusted platforms and remains accessible to the public.
7. **Lower Reservoirs to their Absolute Minimum and Delay Refill:** Our research indicates that the 13 principal reservoirs have not consistently been lowered to empty status prior to the spring Freshet. In addition to this, reservoirs have been refilling at a much faster pace in the last decade than the previous 35 years. By fully emptying the reservoirs to their lowest possible point and delaying refill, it will help to ensure that large spring inflows and usual April and May precipitation events will have the ability to be stored—a critical step in flood risk mitigation efforts.
8. **Acknowledge All Ottawa River Reaches as Reservoirs:** Recognize each "reach" of the Ottawa River between dams as a "reservoir." Although some reaches are classified as having "small" reserve

capacity, the current mandate of the ORRPB fails to account for water management in these areas, referring to them instead as “Run-of-River facilities,” which is misleading. These reaches can span hundreds of kilometers, and minor changes in water management can have significant impacts on municipalities and riparian owners alike. The management of head ponds—sections behind the dam leading into the turbines—greatly influences upstream backwater effects, which often lead to flooding. In conjunction to Action 7, adjusting these reservoirs and reaches to the lowest possible water levels prior to and during the Freshet would help mitigate flooding along the main stem of the river, while equally augmenting the protection for downstream municipalities including Montreal.

## Time to Act Before the 2025 Freshet

ORFA is shining a spotlight on the immediate actions required to prevent a 737-type catastrophic scenario. In this white paper, we have:

- Defined the context
- Identified four key factors contributing to the reoccurring super floods
- Highlighted the major risks and direct impacts of failing to address these key factors
- Proposed eight specific actions that can immediately help to prevent the reoccurrence of the super floods

This proactive, modernized, and climate-adapted proposed approach will enhance safety along the Ottawa River Watershed. It will not require new infrastructure or legislation and will protect over 2 million people from preventable flooding—without generating headlines, causing unnecessary disruption, or straining the budget.

As the veil surrounding the ORRPB is lifted, this whitepaper points to the unwillingness of our levels of government to enforce existing legislation on dam operators. Additionally, it underscores that the ultimate responsibility for prioritizing flood prevention before and during the Freshet lies directly with our elected officials.

Therefore, we must no longer waste time reaching out to the ORRPB, the ORRC, or the Secretariat. The responsibility for setting and enforcing water management policies that can effectively reduce or entirely prevent flooding rests with the following representatives:

All Canadians	ECCC	The Honourable Steven Guilbeault	<a href="mailto:ministre-minister@ec.gc.ca">ministre-minister@ec.gc.ca</a>	800-668-6767
Quebec Residents	MELCCFP	Benoit Charette	<a href="mailto:ministre@environnement.gouv.qc.ca">ministre@environnement.gouv.qc.ca</a>	418-521-3911 or 514 864-8500
Ontario Residents	MNR	Hon. Graydon Smith	<a href="mailto:minister.mnrf@ontario.ca">minister.mnrf@ontario.ca</a>	416-314-2301

It’s time to land this plane.